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Quality in primary care
Individual doctors matter, and pay for performance may reduce hospital admissions
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TheUnited Kingdom has led the world in several national policy
initiatives to improve the quality of primary care, notably by
implementing both nationwide surveys of patient experience
and the largest healthcare pay for performance scheme in the
world—the Quality and Outcomes Framework. This makes the
United Kingdom fertile ground for examining the many
uncertainties surrounding these policy initiatives, two of which
are examined in the linked papers (doi:10.1136/bmj.g6034,
doi:10.1136/bmj.g6423).1 2
Roberts and colleagues used multilevel modelling to explore
whether variation in patient experience was due more to
individual doctors or to the practices within which they worked.1
The doctors were responsible for 3.5 times more variation than
the practices in patients’ experience of communication in the
consultation, and 6.5 times more variation in whether or not
patients trusted their doctor. In contrast, much more variation
existed between practices than between the doctors for four
indicators measuring aspects of patient experience that are less
under the control of individual practitioners, such as cleanliness
of buildings or ease of access.1 This is consistent with the few
other studies that have rigorously examined variation in outcome
at both individual and institutional level,3 suggesting, for
example, that blood pressure measurement for patients with
diabetes varies more between doctors but organisationally
complex processes such as eye screening vary more between
hospitals.4
The study also found that doctors’ scores for communication
varied more in practices where the average score was low,
leading to the conclusion that “higher performing practices
usually contain only higher performing doctors” whereas “lower
performing practices may contain doctors with a wide range of
communication scores.”1 This conclusion is perhaps contentious
since the paper does not report whether any of the practices or
doctors were statistically significantly above or below average
in their performance. This makes it difficult to judge the
meaning of the variation, and it remains unclear whether or how
patients could use doctor level performance data to choose their
doctor, even if such data became publicly available in the future.3
The current English general practitioner patient survey is
designed to measure satisfaction with a practice, not with
individual doctors.
In the second linked paper, Harrison and colleagues examined
whether or not pay for performance improves patient outcomes.2
They carefully examined whether the introduction of the Quality
and Outcomes Framework reduced emergency hospital
admissions for ambulatory care sensitive conditions (ACSCs,
conditions where better primary care is expected to reduce the
need for admission).2 The study compared admissions for
ACSCs incentivised by the Quality and Outcomes Framework,
ACSCs not incentivised by the scheme, and conditions not
thought to be ambulatory care sensitive. It found that subsequent
to the year that the framework was introduced, admissions for
ACSCs incentivised by the scheme decreased in both absolute
terms (a 10% reduction in the actual admission rate) and relative
to the non-incentivised comparators, where admissions rose
steadily.
However, as the authors discuss, the large observed reductions
in admissions are hard to account for given the small changes
in process measures associated with the Quality and Outcomes
Framework. The findings might be partly or wholly due to other
quality improvement activities in the period running up to the
Quality and Outcomes Framework, although these would not
be expected to cause a large change in admissions in the year
that the scheme was introduced. The authors make the
speculative though plausible suggestion that introducing pay
for performance may lead to important changes in the
organisation of care beyond the intended effect on incentivised
processes, and that these associated changes may influence
outcomes (for example, regular incentivised review of people
with coronary heart disease might lead to earlier identification
and treatment of people with poorly controlled angina even in
the absence of incentives specifically to do this, reducing
admissions for unstable angina).
The two papers help to narrow gaps in our understanding of
how tomeasure and improve the quality of primary care. Roberts
and colleagues’ study is a rare example of the practical value
of measuring variation carefully. An important achievement of
the movement to improve quality and safety has been to focus
attention on the importance of systems and context, encouraging
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a shift away from blaming individual professionals for the
failings of the systems within which they work.5 However,
Roberts and colleagues’ study shows that individuals still
matter,6 7 and it is sobering to note that 3% of Australian doctors
account for 49% of complaints escalated to regional or federal
ombudsmen, highlighting that individuals can be an important
determinant of system performance.8 It remains unclear how
systems should respond to individuals whose performance looks
worse than that of their peers, or how best to balance supportive
interventions to improve performance with rarer summative
action to remove from the system those professionals with
persistently unacceptable performance.9
Harrison and colleagues’ study2 contributes substantially to the
small evidence base evaluating whether pay for performance
improves longer term outcomes for patients.10-14 Although their
analysis found significant reductions in related emergency
hospital admissions, the mechanism by which this might have
occurred is uncertain. The authors’ therefore concluded that pay
for performance is no more of a “magic bullet” than any other
quality improvement method, and that long term improvement
is likely to require the persistent use of many different types of
intervention.2 The broader lessons are that pay for performance
remains an improvement method where hope continues to
exceed evidence. Large investments in any improvement
method, especially those with hoped for magic bullet properties,
need to be matched by investment in formal evaluation.14
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